Yemen’s Political Landscape in 2025: Shifts in Power and Peace Prospects

Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes Staff

K. Rahmani is a Jadetimes news reporter covering politics.

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Image Source: Khaled Abdullah

1. A Fragile Peace in a Fractured State

By mid-2025, Yemen teeters between war and tenuous calm. The UN-brokered truce of April 2022 holds only sporadically, while the humanitarian crisis deepens: over 20 million people remain food insecure and 4 million internally displaced. Yet amidst fragmentation, new political coalitions have emerged, rival administrations vie for legitimacy, and foreign patrons recalibrate their influence. Understanding Yemen today requires mapping its competing power centers—the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in Aden, the Houthi administration in Sana’a, the Yemeni National Political Bloc’s ambitions, and a restless civil society demanding accountability. Each actor shapes prospects for peace or further disintegration.

2. A Decade of Turmoil: Political Timeline (2014–2025)

Tracing Yemen’s recent history highlights recurring cycles of conflict, fleeting accords, and shifting patronage.

Year	Milestone
2014	Houthi forces seize Sana’a; House of Representatives splits in Tobruk and Sana’a.
2015	Saudi-led coalition launches Operation Decisive Storm to restore Hadi government.
2016	UN-sponsored Kuwait talks collapse; coalition intensifies air and naval blockade.
2018	Stockholm Agreement yields partial ceasefire in Hodeidah; prisoner exchange framework initiated.
2020	Riyadh Agreement attempts power-sharing between Hadi loyalists and Southern Transitional Council (STC).
2022	Nationwide truce takes effect under UN envoy Hans Grundberg; PLC formed to replace Hadi presidency.
2024	Yemeni National Political Bloc launched with 22 parties in Aden; STC and Hadrami factions later withdraw.
Mar 2025	U.S. designates Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, triggering fresh clashes around vital ports.
May 2025	PM Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigns amid PLC infighting; Salem bin Breik becomes new PM.
Jun 2025	Women-led protests erupt in Aden and Abyan over utilities, wages, and political exclusion.

3. The Yemeni National Political Bloc: Revival or Repetition?

3.1 Origins and Ambitions

Conceived in November 2024, the Yemeni National Political Bloc sought to transcend Aden’s factional politics. Backed by the National Democratic Institute and foreign envoys, its 22 member-parties—from Islah and Nasserists to secular youth movements—pledged to:

• Rebuild state institutions under a unified constitution

• Reclaim southern governorates without partition

• Counter Houthi expansion by presenting a credible alternative vision

3.2 Profiles of Key Players

• Islah Party: Yemen’s largest Islamist movement, balancing alliance with tribal sheikhs and cautious rapprochement with Gulf backers.

• Socialist Party: Historically strong in the south, now recalibrating its secessionist heritage toward federal unity.

• Youth Voices Coalition: A network of activists pushing for transparency and social justice—often sidelined by elder politicians.

3.3 Fractures and Fallout

Within months, fault lines emerged:

• The STC withdrew, citing fears of Aden-centric decision-making.

• Hadramawt clans formed their own “Inclusive Conference,” rejecting bloc mandates.

• External patrons (UAE and Saudi Arabia) quarreled over proxy alignments, undermining cohesive support.

These splits echo past efforts—like the 2013 National Dialogue—which faltered when local grievances outpaced central platforms.

4. The Presidential Leadership Council: Legitimacy Under Siege

4.1 Formation and Structure

In April 2022, six-member PLC replaced President Hadi, tasked with guiding a transition to elections. Its chairman, Rashad al-Alimi, convened stakeholders from north and south under a rotating presidency model.

4.2 Internal Dynamics

• Prime Minister Shake-up: The May 2025 resignation of PM Ahmed Bin Mubarak, after public clashes with al-Alimi, exposed fissures between technocrats and factional heavyweights.

• Southern Representation: PM Salem Bin Breik’s appointment aimed to mollify Hadrami demands but provoked rivals in Aden who saw it as concession to the STC.

4.3 Institutional Paralysis

Without a governing charter or court system to mediate disputes, the PLC’s decrees often stall at the ministerial level. By mid-2025, only 20 percent of its budget had been executed, and salaries for civil servants remained unpaid in many provinces.

5. Houthi Consolidation: From Insurgency to Statecraft

5.1 Military and Administrative Reach

Controlling over 60 percent of Yemen’s population, the Houthis have built parallel institutions—from taxation bureaus in Sana’a to courts in Ibb. Their Supreme Political Council, led by Mahdi al-Mashat, issues decrees recognized by schools and hospitals across the northwest.

5.2 Regional Escalation

• Red Sea Campaign: Since late 2023, Houthis have disrupted Global East-West shipping routes with over 120 maritime drone attacks, drawing U.S., U.K., and Israeli airstrikes on coastal radar and missile sites.

• Proxy Politics: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps advisors have declined in number, yet ideological alignment persists through weapons transfers and media support.

5.3 Ideological Evolution

Originally a Zaidi revivalist movement, Ansar Allah now projects nationalist rhetoric—portraying itself as defender against foreign invasion, thereby courting broad conservative support in the western highlands.

6. Foreign Influence and Diplomatic Realignment

6.1 Saudi Arabia: From Intervention to Disengagement

Citing Vision 2030 economic priorities, Riyadh gradually reduced troop deployments after 2021. In 2025 it shifted focus to post-war reconstruction pledges, conditioning funding on a credible political process that remains elusive.

6.2 United Arab Emirates: Port Deals and Southern Autonomy

The UAE’s backing of the STC has secured control of Aden’s port and key oil terminals in Shabwah and Hadramawt. Abu Dhabi leverages local militias to protect investments in energy and logistics corridors, while promoting federalism as a bulwark against Houthi resurgence.

6.3 Oman and Kuwait: Quiet Mediators

Both nations have quietly hosted back-channel talks between PLC representatives and Houthi envoys. Their role underscores Gulf pragmatism—keeping lines open without overtly siding in a conflict Riyadh and Abu Dhabi view as a secondary theatre.

6.4 United States: Maximum Pressure, Limited Engagement

In March 2025 the U.S. designated the Houthis an FTO, triggering asset freezes and increased drone strikes. Simultaneously, Washington scaled back diplomatic engagement with the PLC, frustrated by Aden’s incoherence, and turned to UN and EU partners to sustain humanitarian corridors.

7. Civil Society Awakening: Voices from the Street

7.1 Women-Led Protests

In spring 2025, women in Aden, Abyan, and Taiz organized marches against unpaid salaries, power cuts, and corruption. Spearheaded by the Yemeni Women’s Union, these protests marked the first mass civic action since the 2011 uprising.

7.2 Youth Digital Activism

Online platforms—like the Marib Data Collective—crowdsource frontline reports, mapping airstrikes and aid deliveries. Their real-time intelligence has pressured NGOs and the UN to correct targeting errors and streamline relief.

7.3 Grassroots Councils

In Sana’a suburbs and Hadrami wadis, local councils elected village elders to negotiate reconstruction contracts. Though unrecognized by the PLC, these bodies have secured water pipelines and school repairs through remittances and NGO grants.

8. Peace Prospects: Scenarios to Watch

8.1 Scenario A – Managed Truce

A reinforced ceasefire with localized power-sharing—akin to the Nagorno-Karabakh “step-by-step” model—maintains the status quo but postpones final settlement.

8.2 Scenario B – Partition by Default

De facto south-north partition solidifies the STC’s autonomous administration in Aden and Houthi rule in Sana’a, with the PLC functioning as a nominal mediator.

8.3 Scenario C – Comprehensive Settlement

A multi-track process—integrating Gaza-style transitional justice, disarmament of militias, and new elections under international supervision—offers a pathway to reunification but faces steep trust barriers.

8.4 Scenario D – Renewed Full-Scale War

Escalating maritime strikes and sectarian assassinations trigger fresh Saudi-led intervention, plunging Yemen back into widespread conflict.

9. Comparative Lens: Transitional Bodies in Libya and Sudan

Feature	Yemen PLC	Libya GNU/HoR Transition	Sudan Sovereign Council
Formation	UN-sponsored, April 2022	Libyan Political Agreement, 2020	Constitutional Charter, 2019
Foreign Backers	Saudi, UAE, U.S.	Turkey, UAE, Russia	Egypt, UAE, Ethiopia
Institutional Clarity	None (no bylaws)	Detailed transitional roadmap	Power-sharing but fraught with coups
Successes	Unpaid salaries resumed in Aden (2023)	Ceasefire in western Libya (2022)	Civilian rule brief window (2019–23)
Failures	Budget paralysis; no elections	Militia fragmentation; stalled polls	Collapse into war (2023)

These analogies illustrate that without robust legal frameworks and genuine power-sharing, transitional bodies risk deadlock or collapse.

10. Timeline: Key Turning Points and Diplomatic Milestones

Date	Event
Jan 2014	Mass protests in Sana’a lead to Hadi government’s power struggle with Houthis
Mar 2015	Saudi-led coalition intervenes, framing Yemen as regional security front
Dec 2018	Stockholm talks produce ceasefire in Hodeidah; UN observers deployed
Apr 2022	Nationwide truce formalized; PLC formed
Nov 2024	Yemeni National Political Bloc launched in Aden
Mar 2025	U.S. designates Houthis FTO; drone strikes target Houthi radar batteries
May 2025	PM Bin Mubarak resigns; Bin Breik assumes office
Jun 2025	Women-led demonstrations surge in Aden, Abyan, and Taiz
Jul 2025	UN warns of potential collapse; ground-level talks hosted in Muscat by Omani mediators

11. Between Hope and Hurdles

Yemen’s path in 2025 is neither linear nor predetermined. The Yemeni National Political Bloc’s ambition to reinvigorate state institutions, the PLC’s struggle to assert authority, the Houthis’ transformation into a de facto administration, and a burgeoning civil society all intersect in a high-stakes dance. Regional patrons—Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Tehran, Washington—pull threads that can stabilize or unravel the tapestry.

Building lasting peace will demand:

• Clear constitutional frameworks

• Disarmament and reintegration of militias

• Inclusive economic recovery plans

• Empowerment of women and youth as agents of change

Yemen today offers a stark lesson: peace is more than the absence of bombs; it is the forging of institutions that deliver services, uphold rights, and bind communities in common purpose. The question remains whether Yemeni actors—domestic and foreign—can summon the political will to turn fleeting truces into durable stability.