Mongolia’s Quiet Power Play: Why Ulaanbaatar Joined Trump’s Board of Peace

Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes Staff

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Image Source: Denis Balibouse

Mongolia’s decision to join the Board of Peace is a deliberate, lowvisibility exercise in strategic hedging. Announced as part of a U.S.led initiative framed around conflict mediation and postwar stabilisation, the Board offers Ulaanbaatar a direct channel to Washington at a moment when the country’s “third neighbour” doctrine is being tested by intensifying greatpower competition. This article presents the news, traces the full history of Mongolia’s balancing strategy, explains what joining the Board of Peace means in practice, compares the move to similar smallstate alignments, and maps the political, economic, and security implications for Mongolia and its neighbours.

The news in brief

Mongolia has accepted an invitation to join the Board of Peace, a U.S. initiative announced by President Donald Trump that positions the United States as a convenor of multilateral stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, with Gaza identified as an initial priority. Ulaanbaatar has not publicly disclosed the financial terms or operational commitments attached to membership. Mongolian officials and analysts describe the decision as pragmatic: a way to secure highlevel access to Washington, attract investment, and expand diplomatic options without abandoning ties to Russia and China.

1. The third neighbour doctrine: origins and evolution

Definition and origin. The “third neighbour” concept—Mongolia’s core foreignpolicy doctrine—refers to cultivating relationships with states beyond its immediate neighbours, Russia and China, to preserve autonomy and diversify economic and security partnerships. The term entered Mongolia’s diplomatic lexicon after U.S. Secretary of State James Baker used the phrase during a 1990 visit, and it has since been institutionalised in Ulaanbaatar’s strategic planning.

Early implementation (1990s–2000s). After democratization in 1990, Mongolia pursued broad engagement with Western democracies, Japan, South Korea, and others to attract investment and technical assistance. The policy combined symbolic gestures—public alignment with Western positions at key moments—with practical cooperation in development and security. Academic reviews trace a pattern of opportunistic engagement: Mongolia joined multilateral initiatives and bilateral partnerships that offered concrete benefits while avoiding formal alliances that might antagonise Moscow or Beijing.

Institutionalisation and policy patterns (2010s–2020s). Over three decades the third neighbour strategy matured into a pragmatic toolkit: hosting foreign missions, participating in UN peacekeeping, negotiating development compacts, and courting diversified trade partners. Recent analyses characterise the policy as adaptive rather than ideological—Ulaanbaatar seeks as many external partners as possible to reduce vulnerability to coercion and to leverage competition among larger powers for domestic gains.

2. Why the Board of Peace matters to Mongolia

Access and symbolism. For a small state, formal inclusion in a U.S.led executive forum confers diplomatic visibility and a symbolic endorsement that can be converted into tangible benefits: meetings with senior U.S. officials, prioritised development assistance, and political cover for policy choices that might otherwise provoke regional pushback.

Economic and development leverage. Mongolia’s economy is heavily resourcedependent and constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks. Participation in the Board creates a plausible pathway to accelerate investment in mining, transport, and energy projects and to revive or extend U.S. development instruments that have previously delivered measurable results in Mongolia.

Peacekeeping and inkind contributions. Mongolia has a strong UN peacekeeping record and could offer trained contingents as inkind contributions to Board missions. This option allows Ulaanbaatar to demonstrate commitment without large cash outlays and to preserve its international profile as a contributor to global security.

Political calculus at home. Highlevel access to Washington can be politically valuable domestically. Leaders in Ulaanbaatar can present Board membership as a diplomatic achievement that strengthens national security and economic prospects—useful currency in domestic politics.

3. What joining the Board of Peace likely entails

Membership tradeoffs. Public statements indicate the Board is designed as a multilateral stabilisation forum; however, the initiative’s structure, budgetary commitments, and operational rules remain opaque. For Mongolia, the likely bargain is access and influence in exchange for diplomatic support, limited operational contributions (peacekeepers, training), and political alignment on specific initiatives.

Operational scenarios. Mongolia could contribute in three main ways:

· Personnel: Deploy peacekeepers or civilian stabilisation teams to Boardsponsored missions.

· Diplomacy: Use its seat to shape mission mandates and to advocate for development priorities that benefit Mongolia’s interests.

· Economic cooperation: Negotiate bilateral or multilateral projects tied to Board activities—transport corridors, mineral development partnerships, or technical assistance.

Risk management. Ulaanbaatar will seek to keep commitments modular and reversible to avoid entanglement in contested theatres or sanctions regimes. The country’s historical pattern is to join initiatives that are loosely defined and operationally limited, minimising the risk of direct confrontation with neighbours.

4. Historical precedents and comparable cases

Mongolia’s past alignments. Mongolia has repeatedly used international initiatives to secure strategic benefits: joining the U.S.led coalition in Iraq (2003) and participating in UN peacekeeping missions are examples of leveraging limited contributions for political capital and development assistance. These precedents show a consistent pattern of transactional engagement rather than ideological alignment.

Smallstate strategies elsewhere. Comparable cases include:

· Georgia and NATOrelated partnerships: Tbilisi pursued partnership programs to secure Western support while managing relations with Russia.

· Jordan and multilateral stabilisation roles: Jordan leverages its strategic location and security contributions to secure aid and diplomatic backing.

· South Korea’s balancing during Cold War transitions: Seoul cultivated ties with multiple powers to maximise security guarantees and economic opportunities.

These analogues illustrate a common smallstate logic: use selective cooperation with major powers to expand strategic options while avoiding full alignment that would provoke retaliation.

5. Risks, constraints, and regional reactions

Moscow and Beijing. Both neighbours watch Mongolia’s external engagements closely. Historically, Ulaanbaatar has calibrated its actions to avoid overt provocation. Moscow’s and Beijing’s responses to Board membership are likely to be measured—diplomatic protests, public statements, or increased bilateral engagement to counterbalance U.S. influence—rather than immediate coercive measures, but the risk of economic or political pressure cannot be discounted.

Legal and reputational dilemmas. Mongolia’s balancing act has produced awkward moments—most notably when it hosted highlevel visits from leaders subject to international controversy while remaining a party to international legal regimes. These tensions highlight the limits of symbolic neutrality when legal obligations and geopolitical realities collide.

Domestic political dynamics. Public opinion in Mongolia is mixed: many citizens value diversified ties and development opportunities, while nationalist and proneighbour constituencies warn against alienating Russia or China. Political leaders must manage these domestic cleavages while extracting benefits from Board membership.

6. Timeline: Mongolia’s thirdneighbour trajectory and the Board decision

· 1990: U.S. Secretary of State James Baker uses the phrase “third neighbour,” catalysing Mongolia’s policy to cultivate partners beyond Russia and China.

· 1990s: Mongolia pursues democratic reforms and opens diplomatic relations with Western states and Japan; early development partnerships begin.

· 2003: Mongolia contributes troops to the U.S.led coalition in Iraq, signalling willingness to partner with Washington on security missions.

· 2010s–2020s: The third neighbour strategy becomes institutionalised; Mongolia expands peacekeeping roles and development partnerships while managing economic dependence on China.

· 2025–2026: Mongolia accepts an invitation to join the Board of Peace, seeking diplomatic access, development leverage, and new deployment opportunities for its peacekeepers.

7. Policy implications and scenarios

Short term (0–18 months). Mongolia will use Board membership to secure meetings, development pledges, and potential investment commitments. Expect announcements of feasibility studies, memoranda of understanding, and targeted technical assistance.

Medium term (18–36 months). If Board engagement yields concrete projects—transport links, mining partnerships, or extended development compacts—Ulaanbaatar will have strengthened its bargaining position with neighbours and investors. Conversely, if the Board remains symbolic, Mongolia risks domestic criticism for limited returns.

Long term (3–7 years). Successful diversification could reduce Mongolia’s economic vulnerability and increase diplomatic autonomy. Failure or regional backlash could push Ulaanbaatar back toward accommodation with Moscow and Beijing.

8.  A pragmatic, lowrisk strategy with outsized symbolic value

Mongolia’s entry into the Board of Peace is best read as a continuation of a longstanding, pragmatic foreignpolicy approach: cultivate as many external partners as possible, extract development and security benefits, and preserve autonomy between two dominant neighbours. The Board offers Ulaanbaatar a highvisibility channel to Washington, potential development leverage, and a platform to repurpose its peacekeeping capacity. The move is calculated, reversible, and consistent with Mongolia’s historical pattern of transactional multilateralism. Whether it produces substantial returns will depend on how concretely the Board translates access into projects and how deftly Mongolia manages the diplomatic sensitivities of Moscow and Beijing.

Middle Powers Align with China Amid Growing Uncertainty

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.

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The rush of Western leaders to Beijing is less about ideology than survival, marking a strategic reset in a fragmented, increasingly multipolar global order.

U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of a bilateral meeting during his visit to China, in Beijing. Image: REUTERS

The recent procession of Western leaders to Beijing - Norway, Finland, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain (for the second time) - signals more than a diplomatic thaw with China. It reflects a deeper structural shift in global politics: the strategic awakening of middle powers in a fragmented, coercive, and increasingly multipolar order. Amid Donald Trump’s erratic, abusive foreign policy and Europe’s internal crises, China is no longer seen merely as a challenger to the West but as a necessary partner and, for many, a safer harbour.

What is a “middle power” in geopolitical terms?

In geopolitical theory, a middle power is a state that lacks the comprehensive dominance of a superpower but possesses sufficient economic, diplomatic, technological, or regional weight to influence international outcomes. Middle powers are not system-makers, but they are system-shapers. They rely on coalitions, institutions, and diplomacy rather than unilateral force. Countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK, France, Germany, and the Nordic states fall into this category, though their relative power has declined because of the rising states like India, Indonesia, or Brazil.

Crucially, “middle power” is not a collective identity. What unites them today is vulnerability: they are deeply embedded in global trade and security networks that are now being weaponized by great powers.

The Western middle powers parading in Beijing

Mark Carney’s blunt formulation - “either you are on the menu or on the table” - captures the dilemma facing middle powers. In an era where tariffs, sanctions, supply chains, and financial systems are instruments of coercion, dependence becomes a strategic liability. The Trump administration’s threats toward allies, such as tariffs on Canada and others, Greenland territorial grabbing, and transactional NATO politics, have destroyed the assumption that alignment with Washington guarantees stability.

For middle powers, engaging with China is less about ideological convergence and more about geopolitical survival. Beijing offers market access, investment, technological cooperation, and, above all, predictability. China now appears to the Western middle powers more consistent compared to an erratic United States that increasingly treats allies as leverage points rather than partners.

What did each country gain from engaging Xi Jinping

The outcomes of these visits have been pragmatic rather than transformative:

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Keir Starmer secured reduced tariffs (notably on whisky), visa-free travel, healthcare and trade agreements, and renewed investment flows. More importantly, London signaled it would not “go back and forth” between Washington and Beijing, asserting strategic autonomy.

Canada: Mark Carney’s visit yielded expanded trade channels, electric vehicle cooperation, and diversification away from overwhelming U.S. export dependence. Symbolically, it reinforced Canada’s refusal to accept U.S. economic coercion.

Finland and Nordic states: These visits focused on technology, clean energy, and industrial cooperation, reflecting China’s role in critical supply chains.

France and Germany: Paris and Berlin seek industrial access, climate cooperation, and technological engagement, while quietly hedging against U.S. unreliability. Germany’s interest in satellite and missile-detection technology underscores Europe’s push for strategic autonomy.

None of these states are “pivoting” fully to China. They are hedging, i.e., reducing exposure to any single great power.

Trump’s reaction and what it means for the U.S.

Donald Trump’s response has been openly hostile. He has described UK-China ties as “very dangerous” and warned Canada that “China is not the answer.” Yet this reaction is deeply revealing. From Washington’s perspective, Western leaders in Beijing represent a loss of control. The post-Cold War order depended not only on U.S. power but also on allied consent. That consent is now conditional.

Ironically, Trump’s threats validate Carney’s argument that economic integration is being used as a weapon. Every tariff threat and every public humiliation reinforces the incentive for middle powers to diversify away from the United States.

What do middle powers expect from China, and how does it change their U.S. relations

Middle powers are not seeking protection from China, but options. They want access to China’s vast market, participation in its industrial ecosystems, and cooperation in areas like green technology, infrastructure, and finance. Equally important, they want leverage: the ability to say “no” to Washington without catastrophic consequences.

Even Trump’s European best friend, Finland’s president Alexander Stubb, has urged Europe to recognise a shift in the United States, saying the current U.S. administration’s foreign policy ideology no longer aligns with Europe’s core values.

This does not end alliances with the U.S., but it rebalances them. The relationship becomes less hierarchical and more transactional. Middle powers are signaling that loyalty can no longer be taken for granted: it must be earned.

Geopolitical takeaways

Several broader conclusions emerge:

1. The rules-based order has fractured: Not because rules never existed, but because the U.S. now openly ignores them when inconvenient.

   
   

2. Middle powers are no longer passive: They are experimenting with coordination, diversification, and “variable geometry” coalitions rather than rigid blocs. Survival is the overriding priority.

   
   

3. China benefits from U.S. overreach: Beijing’s posture of stability and dialogue contrasts sharply with Washington’s unpredictability and its coercive, abusive tone.

   
   

4. Multipolarity is accelerating: Not through the rise of a new hegemon, but through the collective agency of states unwilling to be dominated by only one superpower.

   
   

5. America First is coming to mean America Alone: Isolation is what Trump is producing; to avoid further isolation and disenchantment, coercion is applied.

In short, the parade to Beijing reflects not an ideological conversion, but a pragmatic adjustment to a fractured international order. As the United States increasingly sets aside its own rules and relies on coercion, middle powers are asserting agency through diversification, coordination, and flexible coalitions, with survival as the overriding priority.

China has benefited from this moment not by force, but by projecting stability, dialogue, and predictability in contrast to Washington’s volatility. The result is an accelerating multipolarity, driven less by the rise of a new hegemon than by the collective will of states unwilling to be subordinated to a single power. In this context, “America First” is increasingly perceived as America alone, while Beijing emerges as a central - if not indispensable - pole in a more plural global order.

Olivia Dean Won Best New Artist at the 2026 Grammy Awards

Wanjiru Waweru, Jadetimes Contributor

W. Waweru is a Jadetimes News Reporter Covering Entertainment News

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Image Source: Johnny Nunez/ Getty Images

Olivia Dean received Best New Artist for the 2026 Grammy Awards. She beat out the other nominees: Addison Rae, Lola Young, Alex Warren, Katseye, the Marías, and Sombr. She was established by her recent album, The Art of Loving.

Image Source: Stewart Cook/CBS

In Dean’s acceptance speech, she expressed her ethnic background, aiming for humanity.

“I’m up here as a granddaughter of an immigrant,” said Dean. “I’m a product of bravery, and I think those people deserve to be celebrated. We’re nothing without each other.”

This achievement earned Dean her first-ever Grammy Award in her music career. Her fellow nominee, Leon Thomas, reached his first Grammy as a performer, receiving two awards:  Best R&B Album for Mutt, and Best Traditional R&B Performance for “Vibes Don’t Lie.” He became the only Best New Artist nominee to have a prior Grammy, where he received his contribution as a songwriter to SZA’s 2024 Best R&B Song “Snooze". The  Marías also previously received a nomination for their contribution to Bad Bunny’s 2023 Album of the Year, Un Verano Sin Ti.