Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes
K. Rahmani is a Jadetimes news reporter covering politics.
Image Source: Rodi Said
PKK Announces Disbandment and Disarmament
On May 12, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared its intention to dissolve the organization and hand over its weapons in a series of July 10–12 ceremonies in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. The announcement followed Öcalan’s unprecedented video appeal from İmralı Prison, calling for a permanent ceasefire and an end to armed struggle. President Erdoğan hailed the move as a “critical threshold” toward a terror-free and united Türkiye, setting off cautious celebrations across Kurdish-majority regions and sparking hopes for deep political reforms.
I. Historical Roots of the Kurdish Question
A. Early Ottoman-Era Revolts (1914–1938)
Kurdish uprisings under the late Ottoman Empire began as tax and conscription protests, notably the Bitlis revolt in 1914 and the Barzan insurrection the same year. Following World War I, tribal rebellions in Koçgiri (1920) and the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) were brutally suppressed by Ankara’s forces, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and mass deportations. The Dersim massacre of 1937–38 eradicated Kurdish resistance in central Anatolia, leaving deep scars of violence and distrust.
B. Treaty of Lausanne (1923): Fragmentation of Kurdistan
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne drew Türkiye’s modern borders without mention of Kurdish autonomy or statehood. It replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, which had contained provisions for Kurdish self-determination. By consigning Kurdish-majority lands entirely to Türkiye (and slicing the rest among Iraq, Syria, and Iran), Lausanne extinguished international support for Kurdish statehood and legitimized assimilation policies—laying the groundwork for nearly a century of Kurdish marginalization.
II. Kurds in the Turkish Republic: Denial and Discrimination
A. Cultural Suppression
In the early republic, Kemalist reforms outlawed public use of Kurdish language, dress, and toponyms, treating Kurds as “Mountain Turks.” Publishing or speaking Kurdish was banned until the 1990s; letters not used in Turkish (q, w, x) were forbidden. The state built boarding schools to isolate children from family and force Turkish language acquisition, a campaign later termed “linguicide” by scholars for its erasure of Kurdish identity.
B. Political Exclusion
Pro-Kurdish parties have been repeatedly banned—from HEP (1993) to DEHAP (2003) and BDP (2008)—and elected mayors and MPs removed under anti-terror laws. Kurdish activists, journalists, and academics have faced arrests and lengthy prison terms. Even constitutional reforms in the 2000s failed to guarantee genuine language rights or cultural recognition, reinforcing Kurdish perceptions of systemic injustice.
III. Rise of the PKK: Ideology, Insurgency, and Evolution
A. Founding and Early Ideology (1978–1984)
On November 27, 1978, Abdullah Öcalan and a cadre of Kurdish students established the PKK in Lice, Diyarbakır Province, fusing Marxism-Leninism with Kurdish nationalism. Their manifesto framed Kurdistan as a colonized entity and called for armed struggle against the Turkish state to secure independence and cultural rights.
B. Armed Campaign and State Response (1984–1999)
The PKK launched its insurgency on August 15, 1984, attacking military posts and symbols of Turkish authority in southeastern Anatolia. Ankara’s response involved large-scale military deployments, village evacuations, and airstrikes in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq’s safe havens. Between 1984 and Öcalan’s capture in 1999, more than 35,000 lives were lost, and an estimated 3,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed, displacing over 3 million Kurds.
C. Ideological Shift: From Independence to Autonomy
After Öcalan’s trial and imprisonment in 1999, the PKK began moderating its demands. By the mid-1990s it formally abandoned calls for outright independence in favor of autonomy and cultural rights within Türkiye. Under Öcalan’s later “democratic confederalism” framework, the PKK advocated local self-administration and gender equality, emphasizing grassroots democracy over statehood.
IV. The 2025 Peace Process: Unprecedented Ceasefire and Disarmament
A. Öcalan’s Appeal from İmralı
In February 2025, Öcalan released a rare video message urging all armed groups to lay down weapons and dissolve their structures, citing new political openings under Erdoğan’s government. This marked the first recorded communication from him since 1999 and signaled a decisive break from decades of conflict.
B. Government Reaction and Negotiations
Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın led talks in Ankara and Baghdad, coordinating logistics for disarmament. President Erdoğan formed a special Parliamentary Peace Commission with pro-Kurdish DEM Party members to oversee the process. The government pledged to initiate constitutional reforms recognizing Kurdish language rights and local governance—a major concession that had eluded previous administrations.
V. Regional and International Dimensions
A. Stability in Iraq and Syria
The PKK’s bases in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq had fueled cross-border tensions. Disarmament in Sulaymaniyah is expected to improve security along the Türkiye–Iraq frontier and reduce clashes in Syria’s Kurdish regions, where PKK-linked groups had carved out autonomous zones during the civil war.
B. NATO and EU Reengagement
Western allies, long critical of Türkiye’s human-rights record, hailed the peace agreement as a positive step toward democratic consolidation. Brussels and Washington signaled readiness to resume stalled EU accession talks and deepen NATO cooperation, contingent on follow-through on minority-rights reforms.
VI. Comparative Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict Resolution
Northern Ireland (1998): The Good Friday Agreement ended decades of sectarian violence through devolved power-sharing and guaranteed minority cultural rights—parallels to Türkiye’s proposed autonomous councils.
Basque ETA (2011): Spain’s success hinged on EU mediation and Basque language recognition; however, ETA’s unilateral disarmament lacked the reciprocal constitutional reforms now on Türkiye’s table.
Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (2009): A military defeat without political settlement left Tamil grievances unaddressed; contrastingly, Türkiye’s peace process seeks institutional change alongside disarmament.
VII. Timeline of Key Events
· 1923 – Treaty of Lausanne divides Kurdish lands, denies autonomy.
· 1925 – Sheikh Said Rebellion crushed; Kurdish identity banned.
· 1937–38 – Dersim massacre decimates Kurdish resistance.
· 1978 – PKK founded by Abdullah Öcalan in Lice.
· 1984 – PKK launches armed insurgency; martial law imposed.
· 1999 – Öcalan captured; PKK declares ceasefire and ideological shift.
· 2013–15 – Peace talks falter; violence resumes after 2015.
· Feb 2025 – Öcalan calls for PKK dissolution from prison.
· May 2025 – PKK announces disbandment and weapons handover.
· July 10–12, 2025 – Disarmament ceremonies in Sulaymaniyah.
VIII. Conclusion: From Conflict to Coexistence
The Türkiye–PKK peace deal of 2025 offers a rare chance to end a conflict that has shaped Middle Eastern geopolitics for four decades. Disarmament is only the first step; true reconciliation demands constitutional recognition of Kurdish cultural and political rights, justice for past abuses, and sustained investment in economic development across former conflict zones. If Ankara honors its commitments and Kurdish leaders engage constructively in politics, Türkiye could emerge as a model for resolving protracted ethnic conflicts—a bridge between its diverse peoples rather than a battleground.
The journey from the Treaty of Lausanne’s denial of Kurdish statehood to a historic ceasefire in 2025 underscores the transformative power of dialogue, mutual concessions, and visionary leadership. Yet the path ahead remains challenging: fragmented factions, regional rivalries, and entrenched prejudices must give way to inclusive governance and shared prosperity. Only then can the century-old Kurdish question finally find its answer in peace.
