China’s Growing Role in Indus Waters Dispute Heightens Regional Tensions
- Rahaman Hadisur
- 22 hours ago
- 2 min read
Hadisur Rahman, Jadetimes Staff
H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Asia

The future of the Indus Waters Treaty a landmark water‑sharing agreement between India and Pakistan is in jeopardy, and an unexpected player is drawing global attention: China.
For 65 years, the Indus Waters Treaty has been hailed as a rare example of cooperation between two long‑time rivals, ensuring access to and management of the Indus Basin’s waters. Signed in 1960, the treaty allocated control of the Ravi, Beas and Satluj rivers to India, while Pakistan retained access to the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Despite enduring wars and decades of mistrust, the treaty survived as a stabilizing force in South Asia.
But climate change, territorial disputes over Kashmir, and rising political tensions have strained this fragile arrangement. In April 2025, after a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir that New Delhi blamed on Islamabad, India temporarily suspended its participation in the treaty. Although a June 2025 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration stated that India could not unilaterally suspend the agreement, relations have continued to sour.
Amid these developments, Pakistan has turned to its long‑time partner China for diplomatic and strategic backing. The two nations have deepened cooperation on hydropower projects, including the massive Mohmand Dam and initiatives under the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing’s support was visible during the April skirmishes, when Pakistan employed Chinese‑made military equipment.
China’s involvement is driven by both economic and geopolitical interests. With the Indus River originating in Western Tibet, Beijing holds leverage as an upstream power and has repeatedly signaled its willingness to expand influence in South Asia. In response to India’s suspension of the treaty, China announced an acceleration of hydropower construction in Pakistan‑controlled territory, framing itself as an “all‑weather strategic partner” to Islamabad.
For Pakistan, which relies on the Indus Basin for both agriculture and energy nearly 65% of its population lives in the basin and one‑fifth of its electricity comes from hydropower Chinese collaboration offers a lifeline. But for India, Beijing’s growing presence near sensitive border regions raises alarm. Indian officials have warned that Chinese projects in Tibet could be used as a “water weapon,” potentially disrupting downstream flows.
The situation is further complicated by the Kashmir conflict, as many of these rivers flow through disputed territory. Pakistan’s efforts to enhance hydropower capacity often in partnership with China have drawn criticism in New Delhi, which views such projects as a challenge to its sovereignty and long‑term water security.
Experts in hydro‑politics caution that the Indus Waters Treaty, while historically resilient, is under unprecedented strain. Beijing’s backing of Pakistan, though economically beneficial for both nations, risks escalating regional tensions and undermining a treaty that has been a cornerstone of stability.
To avoid a water crisis spiraling into broader conflict, analysts stress the need for renewed diplomacy. Constructive dialogue among India, Pakistan and China could address not only the future of the Indus Waters Treaty but also the broader environmental and political challenges threatening South Asia’s water security.
Until such engagement occurs, the intersection of water scarcity, territorial disputes and great‑power politics will continue to cast uncertainty over one of the world’s most critical river basins.
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