Beijing’s Expanding Grip: How China Is Redrawing Southeast Asia’s Geopolitical Map

Hadisur Rahman, JadeTimes Staff

H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Asia

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Photo Credit: Jessica C. Liao and Lucas Myers

As Chinese President Xi Jinping wrapped up his high-profile tour of three Southeast Asian nations last week, global attention focused on Beijing’s charm offensive and Washington’s increasing trade isolationism under President Donald Trump. Yet beneath the diplomatic spectacle lies a more consequential trend: China’s methodical, multi-dimensional strategy is steadily unraveling Southeast Asia’s long-standing hedging game and reshaping the region into a Sino-centric sphere of influence.

Beijing’s growing dominance over Southeast Asia is no accident. It is the result of a long-term geopolitical vision, institutionalized by the Chinese Communist Party and reinforced at the April 8 Politburo Work Conference on Neighboring Relations the first of its kind in over a decade. That gathering reaffirmed Beijing's deep commitment to cultivating friendly and stable ties with Southeast Asia, not merely as a foreign policy goal, but as a linchpin of China's strategic survival.

While Washington lurches toward protectionism, Beijing continues to capitalize on America’s retreat. China’s consistent use of economic diplomacy backed by massive trade volumes, infrastructure investments, and institutional engagement has steadily pulled the region into its orbit. The country became ASEAN’s largest trading partner in 2009 and Southeast Asia’s largest trading partner overall by 2020, with bilateral trade topping $696 billion in 2023.

Efforts like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the recently upgraded ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement Version 3.0 have provided Beijing with unparalleled access to Southeast Asian markets, resources, and political influence. Even countries that attempt to resist like Vietnam and the Philippines find themselves entangled in China’s economic gravitational pull.

What’s more, China’s economic presence has translated into growing political leverage. Countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are increasingly reliant on Chinese investment, infrastructure, and even security support. Laos has effectively ceded control of its national power grid to a Chinese firm in a debt-for-equity swap. In Myanmar, Beijing now backs the military junta, even deploying former Chinese military personnel under the guise of private security forces.

Thailand, a long-standing U.S. ally, has also shifted. Bangkok’s growing acceptance of Chinese internal security demands including the deportation of Uyghur refugees and proposed joint police patrols underscores how Chinese capital is shaping domestic policies and security practices in key Southeast Asian capitals.

This economic-political nexus is eroding the sovereignty of weaker regional states and pressuring even stronger ones to accommodate China’s core interests. Southeast Asian governments are now reluctant to oppose Beijing publicly, as seen in their muted response to China’s actions in the South China Sea or its coercive trade tactics against the Philippines. The ASEAN bloc, constrained by consensus-based decision-making and divergent national interests, has failed to present a unified front.

Even Indonesia, the region’s de facto leader and largest economy, has taken cautious steps in managing tensions with China. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta continues to deepen economic ties with Beijing, while refraining from meaningful public opposition to its maritime assertiveness.

The United States’ absence of a coherent, long-term economic strategy in Asia has opened the door for Beijing to fill the vacuum. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy has been heavy on military signaling and light on economic engagement. While Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue appearance attempted to reassure allies, his security-heavy message failed to counterbalance Beijing’s economic advantages.

A 2024 survey of Southeast Asian elites underscores the shift: a growing majority now view China, not the U.S., as the region’s most reliable and important partner. Confidence in American leadership is declining, while skepticism about its staying power continues to rise.

For years, Southeast Asian states have pursued a delicate strategy of hedging balancing security ties with the U.S. while reaping economic benefits from China. That balance is becoming harder to maintain as Beijing’s influence deepens and Washington’s commitment weakens. With limited alternatives and internal divisions, Southeast Asia is finding its room to maneuver shrinking.

The Philippines may still stand defiant under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., but Manila’s position is increasingly isolated. Other regional powers, like Vietnam and Indonesia, remain cautious and pragmatic, unwilling to openly challenge Beijing without credible external support.

Southeast Asia is now facing a sobering reality: its collective hedging strategy is failing. China’s economic dominance, coupled with its growing willingness to intervene in domestic affairs and exert coercive power, has dramatically shifted the regional balance. Without unified regional resistance or robust American economic engagement, the path forward seems clear and it leads through Beijing.

The question that remains is whether Southeast Asia can reclaim strategic autonomy, or whether the region is fated to become a vassal of the Middle Kingdom’s 21st-century order. For now, the trend is unmistakable: China is winning the long game.

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