Climate Change Driving Instability in the Sahara-Sahel Region

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.

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The Saharo-Sahelian zone (SSZ) is the region most exposed to climate change. These processes have a direct impact on regional stability. Soil degradation, droughts, desertification and water scarcity, above all, undermine the region’s food security.

Image credit: Oxfam International

The food crisis is currently affecting more than 7 million individuals, with 3.5 million of them suffering from chronic malnutrition. Located between the Sahara and the humid tropics, the region heavily depends on agriculture and pastoralism, which together make up 40% of the regional GDP and employ 60 to 80% of the population in the Sahara-Sahel Zone (SSZ). However, these sectors are facing repeated climate shocks.

The Struggle for Natural Resources is Intensifying

The climate factor worsens the competition for natural resources, often leading to conflicts that are further fueled by ideological and radical elements, particularly from jihadist groups. While the Sahel has not traditionally been known for extreme religious extremism, it is now home to jihadist organizations, such as Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which exploit the scarcity of resources to recruit vulnerable populations. Among the most affected are pastoralists and farmers, whose tensions have sharply increased. For instance, between June and November 2024, over 1,600 conflicts between agrarians and herders were recorded, centered on disputes over access to pastures, arable land, and drinking water. Therefore, climate change exacerbates the hardships for those dependent on agriculture.

Droughts and soil erosion place tremendous pressure on agriculture across the Sahel. This is particularly evident during the long dry seasons that last from November to April-May, with daytime temperatures in the northern Sahel reaching 45°C. Projections suggest that by 2080, the average temperature in the region could rise by 2-4.3°C. Additionally, the number of extreme hot days, with temperatures exceeding 35°C, is expected to rise to 125. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, such conditions can result in the loss of up to 50% of crops in the region.

In 2021, Mali experienced one of the most severe droughts in recent years, which resulted in a loss of 90,000 hectares of crops. This caused a 10.5% reduction in cereal production nationwide, affecting the food security of over 3 million people. Mali, the second-largest cereal producer in West Africa after Nigeria, consumes approximately 5.4 million tons of cereals. It also plays a vital role in the cross-border grain trade in West Africa, exporting between 10 and 15% of its crops. As a result, any fluctuation in the country’s climate has a ripple effect on the broader region.

Additionally, the Sahel faces the issue of overgrazing, particularly during periods of drought. Overgrazing leads to the destruction of vegetation, which in turn absorbs more solar radiation, raising land surface temperatures. This makes the land more susceptible to severe wind and water erosion. According to official data, over the past 15-20 years, more than 489,000 hectares of arable land in Mali have been lost due to soil erosion. The situation is even worse in neighboring countries. In Niger, the amount of fertile land lost each year is between 100,000 and 120,000 hectares, while in Burkina Faso, this figure ranges from 105,000 to 250,000 hectares, with projections indicating that it could reach up to 360,000 hectares annually.

Climate change is an ally of radicals

Regional droughts in 1968, 1973, 1983, 1985 are identified as one of the key factors of current instability in the region. During this period, more than 250,000 people died due to hunger and disease. The most affected were nomadic Fulani and Tuareg pastoralists who were unable to feed their herds. The national governments, in turn, prioritized the rehabilitation of local farmers, including the Dogon, Hausa and Mosi.

The lack of support from the central authorities and worsening land conflicts between herders and farmers led many Fulanis to radicalize or join jihadist structures for lack of alternatives.

Jihadists are also often joined because they are seen by many as arbiters of justice in disputes over resources, while the central government is unable to control the situation on the ground. In central Mali, for example, one JNIM offshoot, Katiba Macina, has established its own model of resource exploitation. Terrorists define the responsibilities of farmers and pastoralists, regulate their relations, require the clearing of crop residues from fields, collect manure to prevent the reproduction of locusts and other pests, impose restrictions on the cutting of trees, etc.

It is important to note that 60% of JNIM militants are pastoralists who have lost their livestock. Another significant fact is that intensified recruitment of new militants occurs precisely during the dry season, particularly in March-April, when pasture shortages and depleted fodder supplies are observed. For instance, in late 2024, reports already indicated that 42% of settlements in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger were facing fodder shortages. An additional aggravating factor is wildfires, with over 60,000 recorded between May and November 2024. These fires destroyed approximately 1.43 million fodder crops.

Serious climatic fluctuations directly affect pasture availability. According to regional monitoring resources, between November and December 2024, only 2% of the SSZ area had sufficient pasture resources, with 53% of the area having moderately suitable pasture. In turn, there is a shortage of land for grazing in 41% of the territory, and in regions such as Koulikoro, Sikaso (Mali), Tillabéry (Niger) and Est region (Burkina Faso), the pasture situation remains critical.

Prolonged dry seasons have an unfavorable effect on cattle breeding, as it reduces fodder resources and water levels at watering holes, the main sources of which are wells (60%), ponds (20%), boreholes (15%), and rivers (5%). Notably, terrorist organizations seek to exacerbate the problem and are waging a systematic campaign to destroy water infrastructure. Between 2019 and 2024, the frequency of attacks on boreholes, wells, water pumps in the Liptako-Gourma region (triple border zone between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), which is the epicenter of terrorist activity, increased by 40%.

During the rainy season, which lasts from May to September-November, the situation with access to water resources improves, but not everywhere. First, there is an uneven distribution of rainfall. The arid regions of the northern Sahel receive about 100 millimeters of rainfall per year, which corresponds to a desert climate, while in the south rainfall can reach more than 5,000 millimeters per year, leading to widespread flooding. For example, floods from May to November 2024 in West and Central Africa affected more than 2.3 million people, Niger lost 25,700 cattle, Mali 33,000 cattle and 20,100 hectares of grazing land, Burkina Faso 4,100 cattle and 415 hectares of arable land.

In addition to aggravating the situation of herders by eroding pastures and damaging grass cover, heavy rains also increase the risk of herd diseases (foot and mouth disease, dermatosis, pasteurellosis, diarrhea) and disrupt distant livestock routes.

In this regard, it is worth noting that traditional seasonal cattle drives from the central Sahel are gradually shifting further south to the Gulf of Guinea countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Ghana, Togo, Guinea and Benin), where the chance of finding forage resources is much higher. At the same time, the new herd routes are closely monitored by jihadists and other gangs, for whom the hijacking and sale of livestock is one of the key sources of funding (jihadists’ income from livestock sales ranges on average from 25 to 30 million West African francs/$41,000 to $49,000 per month).

Thus, although climate change is not a determining factor that contributes to radicalization and the spread of extremist ideology, it certainly acts as a catalyst for instability in the context of intense competition for resources. Terrorist organizations are trying to use this factor to establish control and take over the distribution of necessary benefits to the population in exchange for loyalty.