Why America Intervenes Late in Indo-Pak Conflicts

Prof. Simranjit Singh is a Jadetimes Editor in Chief

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Image Source: indiandefencereview

In every chapter of Indo-Pak conflict — whether it was the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971, Kargil in 1999, or the near-miss in 2001–02 — one thing has remained remarkably consistent: the United States often arrives late to the table. Not absent, but late. And while American diplomacy has, at times, played a key role in pulling the region back from the brink, the delay has often allowed destruction, mistrust, and instability to deepen before any de-escalation is achieved.

This tardiness is not accidental. It is rooted in a complex calculus of geopolitics, strategic ambiguity, and selective urgency.

Historically, the United States has walked a tightrope in South Asia. During the Cold War, it courted Pakistan as a strategic ally in Western-led alliances like SEATO and CENTO, even while attempting to maintain working ties with non-aligned India. This balancing act meant that Washington was often reluctant to take swift or clear sides in a conflict. Intervention usually came only when the conflict threatened to spiral out of control — or when global attention demanded it.

Moreover, for much of modern history, South Asia has not been a top-tier priority in Washington’s foreign policy hierarchy. The Middle East, Europe, and more recently, the Indo-Pacific theatre vis-à-vis China have often overshadowed South Asia in terms of strategic urgency. This has led to an approach where America watches, waits, and reacts — but seldom leads proactively when Indo-Pak tensions ignite.

One of the most consequential delays came during the 1971 war. The United States, despite clear evidence of atrocities in East Pakistan and impending war, hesitated in its response. Tied to Cold War alignments and wary of alienating a then-ally in Islamabad, the Nixon administration chose silence until the situation exploded into full-scale war — and even then, its tilt was obvious, raising questions about Washington’s moral positioning.

In more recent times, particularly post-Kargil and during the 2001–02 standoff, the U.S. only began active shuttle diplomacy after credible threats of nuclear exchange emerged. The late dispatch of envoys like Richard Armitage and Colin Powell helped defuse tensions — but only after both countries had mobilized forces and the world stood on edge.

Why the delay? Part of it stems from a long-standing U.S. strategy of avoiding deep entanglement in regional disputes unless absolutely necessary. Another factor is misjudgment — an underestimation of how rapidly tensions between India and Pakistan can escalate into war. Add to this the diplomatic dilemma of maintaining defense ties with both nations while managing global optics, and the result is a reactive, rather than preventive, policy.

Yet the stakes today are far greater. With both nations now nuclear-armed, and with the region increasingly entangled in global trade, energy, and technology routes — especially in the wake of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the emerging Middle Corridor — a delayed response is not just dangerous, it’s potentially catastrophic.

At JadeTimes, we believe the time has come for global powers like the United States to rethink their South Asia doctrine. Peace in this region is not a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan alone. It is a global imperative, tied to the future of trade, climate resilience, and international security.

Intervening late might avoid political risk in the short term. But in the long term, it costs lives, trust, and stability. In the next crisis — and there will be one — let America be a peacemaker before the fires spread, not after.