Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.
What was framed as a technocratic discussion on competitiveness was, in reality, a political and existential debate about Europe’s economic model, institutional balance, and global positioning.
The informal European summit held on 12 February 2026 at the medieval castle of Alden Biesen, in eastern Belgium, was staged as a moment of strategic introspection. The informal summit was preceded by a one-day gathering of several high-ranking heads of states, governments, and industrial leaders focused on industrial competitiveness.
Yet the symbolism of Europe’s leaders gathering behind closed doors in a historic Flemish estate to discuss industrial decline, technological lag, and geopolitical vulnerability revealed a deeper anxiety: the European Union increasingly fears irrelevance in a world shaped by the United States and China.
Competing visions for Europe’s economic future
The summit exposed diverging visions among Europe’s key leaders. French President Emmanuel Macron presented perhaps the most ambitious and interventionist agenda. He warned that Europe risks being “swept away” by American technological dominance and Chinese manufacturing prowess unless it invests massively, simplifies rules, and adopts a policy of European industrial preference.
Macron’s strategy rests on four pillars: regulatory simplification, diversification of supply chains, a “Buy European” approach in strategic sectors, and common European debt to finance defence, green technologies, and artificial intelligence. This reflects a long-standing French preference for fiscal integration and a stronger industrial policy at the EU level.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, by contrast, emphasised productivity and market efficiency over fiscal integration. He rejected eurobonds as a distraction from structural reforms and productivity deficits, aligning with Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in advocating deregulation, private capital mobilisation and openness to trade. This emerging Berlin–Rome axis seeks a “Made with Europe” model rather than a protectionist “Made in Europe” framework, reflecting concerns that strategic autonomy could degenerate into trade barriers and deter foreign investment.
Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever positioned himself as a pragmatic broker, calling for regulatory simplification and lower energy prices while urging a concrete roadmap to restore competitiveness.
Nordic and Baltic countries such as Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands remained sceptical of protectionism, warning that European preference policies could alienate investors and undermine the EU’s open trade identity. Meanwhile, leaders from smaller member states, including Greece and Cyprus, highlighted energy market integration and investment mobilisation as priorities, revealing the heterogeneity of national economic concerns.
Draghi, Letta, and the politics of expertise
The presence of former Italian prime ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta highlighted the technocratic framing of the summit. Their 2024 reports on competitiveness and the single market have become quasi-canonical texts in Brussels, shaping discourse on deregulation, capital markets, and industrial policy. Draghi’s report, in particular, diagnosed Europe’s structural weaknesses: fragmented capital markets, high-energy costs, and slow innovation diffusion - and recommended decisive reforms.
At Alden Biesen, Draghi stressed the deterioration of the economic environment since 2024, calling for the reduction of single market barriers, mobilisation of European savings, targeted European preference, and enhanced cooperation among willing member states. Letta reiterated his vision of completing the single market, particularly in services, by 2027.
Yet their influence raises critical questions about democratic legitimacy and political leadership. Draghi has been hailed as a new oracle of European competitiveness, but whether he galvanises public opinion remains doubtful. The technocratic nature of these reports risks reinforcing the perception that Europe’s economic strategy is being crafted by elite experts rather than democratic deliberation, as put forward by Alberto Alemanno. He argues that policymakers cherry-pick deregulation recommendations while ignoring calls for common investment and social policy, thereby narrowing the policy debate.
Leadership, institutions, and the democratic dilemma
A recurring theme at the summit was institutional friction. Several leaders criticised the European Parliament for slowing legislative processes, while others blamed Brussels for overregulation. At the same time, civil society organisations and academics warned that the push for deregulation and accelerated lawmaking could undermine democratic safeguards, public consultation, and impact assessments.
Proposals discussed in the retreat include empowering national governments to pause EU laws deemed burdensome, limiting parliamentary amendments, and increasing the European Council’s oversight over the Commission.
Such shifts would represent a significant rebalancing of institutional power, reinforcing the role of national governments at the expense of supranational institutions. This tension reflects a broader dilemma: can the EU reconcile the need for rapid strategic action with its commitment to democratic governance and participatory policymaking?
A wake-up call or another missed opportunity?
The summit was widely portrayed as a final wake-up call. European leaders openly acknowledged that if the EU fails to act now, it may lose its industrial base, technological sovereignty, and geopolitical influence. The symbolism of Europe - birthplace of the Industrial Revolution - struggling to compete with Silicon Valley and Chinese manufacturing hubs was not lost on participants.
However, Alden Biesen was not a decision-making forum. No binding commitments were adopted, and concrete policy measures were deferred to a formal European Council meeting in March. Leaders agreed on broad priorities - completing the single market, reducing regulatory burdens, lowering energy prices, and pursuing an ambitious trade policy - but timelines and enforcement mechanisms remain vague. Enhanced cooperation among subsets of member states emerged as a potential tool to bypass political deadlock, signalling a move towards a multi-speed Europe.
Geopolitical implications: between autonomy and alliance
The summit’s competitiveness debate cannot be separated from geopolitics. European leaders repeatedly invoked the United States and China as benchmarks and rivals. The return of Donald Trump to the White House, with a purely transactional and protectionist stance, has intensified European debates on strategic autonomy.
Some leaders, notably Macron, argue that Europe must reduce dependence on US technology, energy, and defence, while also countering Chinese economic coercion. Others fear that assertive autonomy could provoke trade retaliation and weaken the transatlantic alliance. Baltic and Nordic countries, in particular, prioritise free trade and diversification of export markets over protectionist measures, reflecting their vulnerability to external coercion and their reliance on open markets.
The summit thus revealed a fundamental geopolitical divide: whether Europe should pursue a more independent, interventionist economic model or reinforce its role within a liberal global trading system anchored in the Euro-Atlantic alliance. While no one declared the alliance finished, the debates suggested a gradual decoupling of strategic thinking from automatic alignment with Washington.
What was actually decided?
Despite the rhetoric, tangible outcomes were limited. Leaders agreed to:
Task the European Commission with preparing an action plan on competitiveness, energy prices, and administrative burden.
Continue discussions on Savings and Investment Union and capital markets integration.
Explore enhanced cooperation mechanisms among willing member states.
Maintain high-level political focus on competitiveness in upcoming European Council meetings.
In addition, a coalition of like-minded countries led by Italy, Germany, and Belgium committed to continuing coordination ahead of the March summit, although Spain criticised this parallel structure for undermining EU solidarity. These steps suggest incrementalism rather than a transformative leap.
Key takeaways from Alden Biesen
First, the summit and the industry competitiveness pre-summit confirmed a growing sense of urgency and strategic anxiety among European leaders. Competitiveness has moved from a technocratic issue to a central geopolitical priority.
Second, Europe remains divided on the means to achieve competitiveness. The fault lines between fiscal integration and market liberalisation, protectionism and openness, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism remain unresolved.
Third, technocratic expertise, embodied by Draghi and Letta, increasingly shapes the discourse, but risks sidelining democratic institutions and public participation.
Fourth, tangible policy outcomes were limited, reinforcing doubts about Europe’s capacity to translate diagnosis into action.
Finally, the summit highlighted that Europe’s competitiveness debate is inseparable from its geopolitical positioning. Whether the EU can reconcile strategic autonomy with transatlantic partnership, and economic resilience with democratic legitimacy, will define its role in the emerging global order.
In Alden Biesen, Europe confronted its fears and ambitions. Whether this retreat marks the beginning of a genuine transformation or another chapter in Europe’s long tradition of incrementalism remains uncertain. What is clear is that the castle summit laid bare a continent wrestling with its industrial future, institutional identity, and geopolitical destiny.
