Trump Envoy Visits Gaza Aid Sites Amid Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

Hadisur Rahman, JadeTimes Staff

H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering the USA

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Image Source: Steve Witkoff/CBS News

President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee made a high-profile visit to southern Gaza on Friday, amid mounting international criticism over deepening starvation, medical shortages, and deadly chaos surrounding humanitarian aid distribution.

The pair toured a distribution center operated by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)—a U.S. and Israeli-backed initiative located in Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost city. The visit was aimed at assessing conditions on the ground and reporting back directly to President Trump. “We received briefings from the IDF and spoke to folks on the ground. GHF delivers more than one million meals a day, an incredible feat,” said Ambassador Huckabee on social media.

Witkoff emphasized the urgency of the visit: “Today, we spent over five hours inside Gaza level setting the facts on the ground, assessing conditions, and meeting with GHF and other agencies,” he said. “The purpose of the visit was to give President Trump a clear understanding of the humanitarian situation and help craft a plan to deliver food and medical aid to the people of Gaza.”

A GHF spokesperson, Chapin Fay, said the foundation was honored to host the U.S. delegation, adding, “We were proud to demonstrate the impact of delivering over 100 million meals.”

The GHF operates four major aid distribution sites in zones controlled by the Israeli military. While designed to deliver relief, these locations have become flashpoints for violence. Crowds have repeatedly come under fire from Israeli forces, or been caught in deadly stampedes.

The Israeli military claims it only uses warning shots to deter chaos. GHF says its private security contractors deploy only non-lethal means like pepper spray or warning gunfire. However, hundreds of deaths have been reported in recent months, many blamed on live fire and heavier weaponry used near distribution areas. A report from Human Rights Watch released Friday condemned the system as a “flawed, militarized aid distribution operation that has turned aid efforts into regular bloodbaths.”

The visit follows the collapse of U.S.-brokered ceasefire talks in Qatar last week. President Trump has since pledged to seek alternative routes for hostage rescue and humanitarian relief.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Witkoff's mission is part of a broader initiative to “save lives and end this crisis,” emphasizing that Trump “cares deeply about the suffering in Gaza.”

In a related social media post, President Trump reiterated his belief that the “fastest way to end the crisis” would be for Hamas to surrender and release the remaining hostages, believed to include 20 survivors from the October 7, 2023, attack.

Since the war began, more than 60,000 Palestinians have been killed according to Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry, which international bodies such as the UN recognize as the primary source of casualty data, despite its affiliation with Hamas.

While the flow of aid has partially resumed through land and airdrops, humanitarian agencies argue the volume remains drastically insufficient. A UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) video released Thursday shows aid convoys being swarmed by desperate civilians as gunfire echoes nearby. “We were met on the road by tens of thousands of hungry and desperate people who directly offloaded everything from the backs of our trucks,” said Olga Cherevko, an OCHA field officer.

According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Gaza is now “actively experiencing famine,” worsened by Israel’s two-and-a-half-month blockade of all aid.

Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, the security situation inside Gaza continues to make safe distribution nearly impossible. Much of the limited aid that does enter is reportedly being hoarded or sold at inflated prices, leaving millions without access to basic necessities.

The current war between Israel and Hamas began when Hamas launched a deadly cross-border attack on October 7, 2023, killing around 1,200 Israelis and taking 251 hostages. In retaliation, Israel launched a massive military campaign across Gaza.

As both the humanitarian toll and international pressure mount, the Trump administration’s approach to aid and diplomacy in Gaza is under intense scrutiny.

From Shusha to Sakura: A Dance of Heritage and Harmony

Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes Staff

K. Rahmani is a Jadetimes news reporter covering culture.

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Image Source: Tofik Babayev

Introduction: A Cultural Debut in Wakayama

In August 2025, the Wakayama International Exchange Center hosted “Azerbaijani National Dance,” a three-part cultural showcase that brought the energy of the Caucasus to Japan’s Kansai region. Attendees explored Azerbaijani traditional costumes, music, and dance, from the communal circles of Yalli to the evocative steps of the Mountains of Shusha, and even savored Azerbaijani tea over vibrant discussions on heritage and identity.

The Wakayama Event Unpacked

Part I: Visual Journey Through Costume and Music

Guest speaker Minara Shukurova kicked off the event with a richly illustrated presentation on national attire—intricately embroidered garments that speak of regional identities—and the musical backdrop of tar and qanun that underpins every folk rhythm.

Part II: Seminar on Key Dances

Dance expert Lala Aslanur, streaming live from Baku, led an in-depth seminar on Yalli and Mountains of Shusha. She traced Yalli’s origins to ancient communal rites, demonstrated its circle-holding formation, and unpacked the syncopated footwork that symbolizes unity and collective strength in Azerbaijani culture.

Part III: Tea Culture and Intercultural Connections

Rounding out the program, Shukurova introduced participants to Azerbaijan’s renowned tea traditions. Guests sampled black tea brewed strong, paired with sweets and fruits, reinforcing the event’s ethos: dance and hospitality are inseparable threads in the fabric of Azerbaijani life.

A Comprehensive History of Azerbaijani Dance

Ancient Ritual Roots

Petroglyphs at Gobustan and Gamigaya, dating from the 4th to 1st millennia BCE, depict figures in dance-like poses, indicating that movement was integral to hunting magic and fertility rituals in the Caucasus. Ceremonial dances such as Samani (spring renewal), Khydir Ilyas (invoking rain), and Godu (harvest blessings) laid the groundwork for structured folk traditions.

Medieval to Early Modern Evolution

As trade caravans traversed the Silk Road, Persian, Arab, and later Turkic influences interwove with indigenous Caucasus customs. By the medieval era, circular and line dances flourished in village celebrations, weddings, and warrior assemblies, each region developing its own variations in tempo and dress.

19th and Early 20th Centuries: Codification and Diversity

The late 1800s saw choreographers like Alibaba Abdullayev formalize dances such as Asma Kasma, Mirzayi, and Chichekler, assigning them specific musical compositions and costume palettes. Regional masterpieces—Agir Karadagi from Shaki, Nalbeki with its saucers and cups, and Ceyrani the “gazelle dance”—demonstrated the breadth of female and male performance styles.

Soviet Era and State Ensembles

Under Soviet patronage, the Azerbaijan State Dance Ensemble was founded to preserve folk forms while adapting them for theatrical tours. This period standardized group formations and expanded the repertoire with stylized interpretations of Lezginka, Shalakho, and modern ballets inspired by folk motifs.

UNESCO Recognition and Global Ambassadorship

Azerbaijani folk dance, including Muğam-inspired movements and circle dances, earned UNESCO intangible cultural heritage status in recognition of its living traditions and community value. Since then, state and private troupes have toured Europe, Asia, and the Americas, sharing dances that evoke the Caspian’s rhythms and the Caucasus’ steppes.

Yalli, Kurdish Dances, and Shared Caucasus Lineages

Yalli’s hallmark is its hand-in-hand circle, steady meter, and communal ethos—features it shares with Kurdish round dances like Halparke and Govend. Variants such as Kochari and Tanzara appear in both Azerbaijani and Kurdish repertoires, reflecting centuries of cohabitation and cultural exchange across mountain valleys2.

Turkic Migrations and Dance Adaptation

Turkic-speaking peoples began settling in the Caucasus around the 11th century CE, following waves of migration from the steppes of Central Asia between the 4th and 11th centuries. Although these newcomers brought distinct musical scales and instruments, they adopted preexisting communal dances—Yalli, Lezginka, and ritual forms—integrating them into their own cultural practices while preserving the dances’ ancient origins6.

Comparative Spotlight: Other International Dance Exchanges

While the Wakayama event marked Azerbaijan’s first major dance showcase in Japan, Baku itself hosted the VI International Folk Dance Festival “Friendship Bridge” in July 2025. That gathering assembled folk ensembles from over 20 countries, each carrying national flags in a parade of cultures along the Caspian shore—an echo of Wakayama’s cross-cultural dialogue but on home turf and a grander scale.

Timeline of Azerbaijani Dance Evolution

Period	Milestone
4th – 1st millennia BCE	Gobustan & Gamigaya petroglyphs depict ritual dances
Ancient eras (pre-10th c.)	Ritual dances: Samani, Khydir Ilyas, Kosa-Kosa
11th c.	Turkic migrations introduce new instruments and musical modes
Late 19th c.	Codification by Alibaba Abdullayev; emergence of regional dances
Mid-20th c.	Formation of Azerbaijan State Dance Ensemble under Soviet guidance
2008	UNESCO inscribes Azerbaijani folk dances as intangible heritage
August 2025	“Azerbaijani National Dance” event in Wakayama, Japan

Conclusion: Dance as Diplomatic Bridge

From ancient rock carvings to modern stages, Azerbaijani dance endures as a vessel of communal memory, artistic innovation, and intercultural dialogue. Wakayama’s embrace of Yalli and Mountains of Shusha reaffirms that these steps transcend borders—binding Azerbaijan, the Kurdish highlands, historic Turkic routes, and now Japan in a shared choreography of heritage and harmony. Whether under cherry blossoms or mountaintops, every circle dance tells a timeless story of unity.

Denmark’s Defense Budget 2025: Record Surge, Doctrine Reset, and the New Nordic Balance

Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes Staff

K. Rahmani is a Jadetimes news reporter covering politics.

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Image Source: Pavel Golovkin

Denmark just moved from cautious pragmatism to hard-edged preparedness. In 2025, Copenhagen launched a two‑year, 50 billion DKK (€6.7B) Acceleration Fund that lifts defense spending above 3% of GDP — the fastest and largest leap in a generation. This isn’t merely budgetary; it’s doctrinal. The state is retooling procurement, retraining forces, and reorganising governance to field capabilities in months, not years, with Russia’s rebuilding timeline and the Baltic‑Arctic theatre squarely in view.

Breaking news: What Denmark announced — and why it matters

Denmark’s government unveiled an Acceleration Fund of 50 billion DKK for 2025–2026, explicitly designed to “buy, buy, buy” urgently needed capabilities, streamline decisions across the Ministry of Defense and Defense Command, and push national defense spending above 3% of GDP for the period. The fund can also be used to bolster military support to Ukraine. The move rests on assessments that, within two years of the war’s end, Russia could regain sufficient offensive power to threaten one or more NATO countries if allied rearmament lags.

• Speed as strategy: Copenhagen will prioritise direct contract awards to compress timelines, deepen industry cooperation, and pre‑train units to use incoming kit the moment it arrives, as Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen emphasised.

• Above 3% of GDP: Denmark’s finance and foreign policy authorities confirm the 2025–2026 upswing will exceed 3% of GDP at the time of budgeting, a step change for a traditionally lean Nordic force.

• Alliance signalling: The package is explicitly framed as burden‑sharing — meeting NATO capability targets faster and stabilising the Alliance’s northern flank while hardening Arctic and North Atlantic lines of communication.

The core message: Denmark is trading procedural comfort for wartime urgency, accepting legal risk and political heat to compress a decade of modernisation into two to three years.

The 2025 package in detail: Money, mechanisms, and milestones

Allocations and capability focus

• Air and missile defence: Advanced ground‑based air defence (GBAD), missile stockpiles, and anti‑drone systems moved to the front of the queue to plug high‑threat gaps in the air domain.

• Logistics and sustainment: Ammunition stocks, host‑nation support, and heavy brigade enablers will be accelerated to meet NATO force generation timelines.

• C4ISR and sensors: Fast‑tracking situational awareness — from satellite capability advances to sensor integration and operational IT upgrades — to shorten the sensor‑to‑shooter loop.

• Arctic and infrastructure: Facilities, connectivity, and reception hubs to harden Denmark’s role as a transit and surveillance node across the Baltic‑Arctic seam.

• Ukraine support window: The fund can top up Denmark’s already substantial assistance, sustaining Denmark’s frontline donor role.

Sources for this subsection: Danish MoD fact sheet and announcement.

Governance and process redesign

• Acceleration Fund authority: The Chief of Defence provides military prioritisation; the MoD’s Materiel and Procurement Agency (FMI/DALO) executes. A new proposal portal invites Danish and foreign companies to submit ready‑to‑deliver solutions with firm timelines and pricing, optimised for rapid evaluation and fielding.

• Legal fast lane (Article 346 TFEU): Denmark will more frequently use national security exemptions to award contracts directly — a deliberate break with business‑as‑usual tendering to gain time. Policymakers acknowledge elevated risks of mispurchases, cost overruns, and more bid protests as trade‑offs for speed.

• Sustained tail funding: Beyond the initial 50 billion DKK, an annual framework of 10 billion DKK (2027–2033) is reserved to absorb in‑service costs arising from accelerated buys.

Sources for this subsection: DLA Piper legal analysis; FMI submission portal; Danish MoD fact sheet.

The arc of Danish defence doctrine: From sea power to expeditionary era — and back to deterrence

1510–1864: Maritime power, then strategic retrenchment

• Sea power origins: The 1510 establishment of a permanent Royal Danish Navy anchored a Baltic‑North Sea identity.

• Schleswig shock: Defeat in 1864 forced territorial contraction and a defensive posture that shaped Danish strategic conservatism.

1864–1945: Neutrality’s limits

• Interwar underinvestment: Post‑WWI pacifism left Denmark exposed. German occupation in 1940 imprinted a lasting lesson on readiness and resilience.

1949–1991: NATO membership, “footnote policy,” and territorial defence

• Alliance over autonomy: Denmark joined NATO in 1949, shelving a Scandinavian defence union. The “footnote policy” constrained nuclear‑related and certain NATO activities while retaining strong territorial defence, including Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

1991–2014: Expeditionary turn

• Coalition competence: Denmark traded heavy formations for deployable, interoperable forces in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, building a reputation for high‑quality expeditionary contributions.

2014–present: Return to collective defence

• Baltic reorientation: Crimea’s annexation re‑centred territorial defence and Baltic‑Arctic vigilance; Denmark boosted eFP deployments and rebuilt high‑end enablers.

• Doctrinal consolidation: The 2022 “Danish Security and Defence towards 2035” report reframed strategy around a harder environment: great‑power competition, tech race, Arctic contestation, and tighter NATO‑EU burden‑sharing — setting conditions for today’s acceleration model.

Source for conceptual reset and 2035 outlook: Danish security policy report.

Current force structure and modernisation: What’s changing on the ground?

• Airpower: Transition to F‑35A continues, deepening fifth‑generation integration and alliance interoperability. Air and missile defence is being rebuilt at pace to counter drones, cruise missiles, and stand‑off threats.

• Army: Emphasis on a heavy infantry brigade with improved fires, mobility, and sustainment, underpinned by ammunition stockpile recovery and pre‑positioned logistics.

• Navy: A new patrol vessel programme with green technologies and enhanced sensors is in train; maritime engines and surface combatant upgrades reflect Baltic and GIUK‑gap priorities.

• Digital and cyber: Operational IT and resilient comms are being hardened; cyber defence is a central pillar given Denmark’s high digital exposure.

• Ukraine commitments: Denmark has led on joint coalitions (e.g., Leopard MBTs), pledged near‑$1B‑scale packages, and aligned industrial collaboration with allied partners.

Sources for this subsection: Army Technology on Denmark’s collaborations, GBAD, F‑35, and naval plans.

• Budget baselines and big‑ticket items: The 2024 Finance Act allocated 36.2 billion DKK to the MoD, with 27 F‑35As financed within the defence framework (approx. 20 billion DKK through 2026). NATO’s accounting differs from national budgeting, so Denmark’s NATO‑reported defence spending is higher than the domestic MoD total — a critical nuance in cross‑ally comparisons.

Source for budget structure and NATO definition: Danish MoD expenditure explainer.

Spending levels and fiscal context: Where Denmark stands — and how fast it got here

• SIPRI series: Denmark’s military outlays rose from $5.48B (2022) to $8.14B (2023), a 48.8% jump — the steepest single‑year increase in modern Danish data, illustrating the post‑2022 inflection.

• Cross‑cycle acceleration: The government’s 2025 Annual Progress Report confirms that with the Acceleration Fund and Ukraine support, defence and security spending in 2025–2026 is expected to exceed 3% of GDP at the time of budgeting — a break with decades of sub‑2% norms.

• What “defence” includes: NATO’s broader definition (pensions, some cross‑ministry costs) inflates the alliance‑comparable metric relative to Denmark’s MoD ledger — why reported “% of GDP” can look higher than the ministry’s headline budget.

Sources: Macrotrends SIPRI‑based series; TradingEconomics (SIPRI); Danish MoF Annual Progress Report 2025; Danish MoD expenditure explainer.

Nordic and Baltic comparison: Posture, trajectory, signatures

Country	Trajectory	Signature investments	Notable commitments
Denmark	>3% of GDP in 2025–26; acceleration model	GBAD, missiles, ammo, Arctic and logistics, satellite and sensors	Rapid direct awards; Ukraine support channel; F‑35 integration
Norway	High baseline with maritime focus	Submarines, F‑35 sustainment, Arctic surveillance	North Atlantic ASW leadership
Sweden	Rising post‑NATO accession	Air defence, Gotland fortification, Baltic Sea denial	Alliance integration after accession
Finland	Sustained high readiness	Artillery mass, border fortification, dispersal	NATO’s front‑line resilience model
Lithuania	Toward 5–6% by 2026–2030	Heavy armour, missile defence, force expansion	Early adopter of 3%+ norm

Sources: Danish announcements and fact sheets; Army Technology; The Defense Post note on allies (UK 2.5% pledge; Lithuania 5–6% path).

Denmark’s outlier is speed: rather than phasing over a decade, Copenhagen is compressing procurement into a 24‑month surge and pre‑funding lifecycle tails — a model others may emulate under Article 346 if industrial bottlenecks persist4.

Strategic drivers and scenarios: The logic behind the pivot

• Russian force regeneration: Danish intelligence assesses a two‑year window for Russia to restore offensive capacity sufficient to threaten NATO if allied rearmament stalls — narrowing the timeline for deterrence by denial in the Baltic theatre.

• Arctic and North Atlantic: Great‑power competition in the High North raises the premium on ISR, patrol, and infrastructure in Greenland/Faroe Islands, with Denmark as a hinge between the Baltic and GIUK gap.

• Alliance division of labour: The 2035 report anticipates more integrated NATO‑EU roles, with Europe scaling industry, munitions, and air defence as the U.S. oscillates — making Denmark’s speed‑to‑capability a political signal as much as a military one.

• Technology and resilience: Cyber, space, and supply chain security are now core to defence planning; hence the emphasis on operational IT, sensors, satellite capability, and stockpile recovery.

Sources: Danish MoD news and 2035 security report; MoD fact sheet.

Procurement, law, and industry: How acceleration will actually work

• Direct awards under Article 346: The fund explicitly leans on the national security exemption to buy off‑the‑shelf, mature capabilities quickly, accepting a higher risk of vendor challenges and post‑award scrutiny. The market should expect more complaints before Denmark’s Complaints Board for Public Procurement — a normal friction when time is the priority variable.

• Open “proposal form” channel: FMI’s portal invites companies to submit concrete, rapidly deliverable packages with proof of maturity, delivery schedules, and costs; realism and precision are the price of admission. This favours suppliers with inventory, surge capacity, or proven COTS solutions.

• Lifecycle realism: The government pre‑allocated 2027–2033 framework funds to absorb downstream costs from rapid buys — a key lesson from past surges where O&S tails were under‑budgeted.

Sources: DLA Piper analysis; FMI portal details.

Politics and public opinion: From EU opt‑out to frontline posture

• Opt‑out abolished, posture transformed: The 2022 referendum ended Denmark’s EU defence opt‑out, enabling full CSDP participation and a more integrated European approach. As Council Presidency in 2025, Denmark put defence — especially Ukraine support and EU rearmament — atop the agenda.

• Public mandate for seriousness: A March 2025 Verian poll for Think Tank EUROPA found 65% of Danes support sending Danish troops to a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine if a peace agreement is reached — strong societal backing for a security role that extends beyond donations to stabilisation and deterrence.

Source: Think Tank EUROPA briefing (with poll details).

Timeline: Milestones in Danish defence and security

Year	Milestone
1510	Permanent Royal Danish Navy established
1864	Second Schleswig War defeat; strategic retrenchment
1940	German occupation underscores the cost of underpreparedness
1949	NATO accession; Scandinavian defence union idea shelved
1980s	“Footnote policy” limits nuclear‑related NATO activities
1990s	Expeditionary era begins (Balkans, later Afghanistan/Iraq)
2016	F‑35 acquisition approved within defence framework
2022	EU defence opt‑out abolished by referendum
2023	Defence Agreement 2024–2033 concluded (June)
2024	MoD budget set at 36.2B DKK (Finance Act)
2025	Acceleration Fund (50B DKK) lifts spending above 3% of GDP; portal opens for rapid proposals

Sources: Danish MoD expenditure explainer (2016 F‑35 agreement; 2024 budget; 2024–2033 agreement); Danish MoD 2025 announcement and fact sheet; Think Tank EUROPA for 2022 referendum context.

Denmark’s 2025 surge is a doctrinal reset disguised as a budget. By prioritising air and missile defence, logistics mass, ISR, and rapid fielding — and by rewriting its procurement tempo under Article 346 — Copenhagen is acting like a state with a short clock and a long memory. The outcome, if sustained, is a small power with outsized leverage in the Nordic‑Baltic‑Arctic theatre: fast, interoperable, hard to surprise, and politically aligned with a Europe that must carry more of its own weight.