Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Energy Pact Signals New Era of Central Asian Independence

Hadisur Rahman, JadeTimes Staff

H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Asia

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Image Source: BP

In a transformative move that may redefine Central Asia’s energy landscape, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have entered into a landmark Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) that promises far-reaching economic, geopolitical, and environmental consequences. At its core, the deal marks a strategic collaboration between Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR and Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy for the joint exploration and development of the Ustyurt Basin in northwest Uzbekistan.

So, what are we going to get from this historic agreement? First, this deal represents a profound pivot from traditional reliance on Russian and Chinese energy corridors. Both Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, long overshadowed by dominant powers in the region, are now stepping into leadership roles defining their own terms of cooperation, growth, and sovereignty.

The Ustyurt Basin, historically underdeveloped due to outdated infrastructure, now becomes the focal point for SOCAR’s eastward expansion. The agreement offers SOCAR favorable tax and cost recovery conditions, structured under Uzbekistan’s reformed PSA legal framework now considered one of the most internationally aligned in Central Asia.

For Uzbekistan, this PSA is more than just a business deal. It's a validation of the sweeping energy reforms implemented since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016. Since then, the country has centralized its energy oversight, welcomed private investment into renewables, updated its legal frameworks, and attracted funding and technical assistance from global institutions like the World Bank, EBRD, ADB, and AIIB.

The partnership allows Uzbekistan to retain sovereign control while offering operational autonomy to investors a hybrid strategy that balances national interests with global standards.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is looking beyond its traditional export routes through the Southern Gas Corridor. With its mature oil fields declining, SOCAR is pivoting toward a broader regional role, offering upstream consulting, legal expertise, and project finance structuring. This is how Azerbaijan is positioning itself not just as an energy exporter, but as a regional integrator and institutional model-builder.

This agreement follows SOCAR’s successful expansions in Georgia and Turkey, and now brings Uzbekistan into a growing network of regional partners committed to self-defined, rules-based energy cooperation.

Now, we shift focus to the broader context: the Caspian Green Energy Corridor. Announced at COP29 in Baku, this initiative aims to export renewable energy from Central Asia to Europe. With trilateral participation from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, the corridor includes plans for a 400-kilometer submarine cable under the Caspian Sea and integration with EU electricity standards through the ENTSO-E.

The newly established Green Corridor Alliance a joint venture involving Azerenerji, KEGOC, and Uzbekistan’s grid operator signals strong institutional commitment and international alignment, particularly with EU Green Deal objectives.

What Do We Learn From This Agreement?

This is what we get to know from the Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan PSA:

1. Geopolitical Maturity: Regional actors are asserting independence from superpower dominance.

2. Economic Resilience: The agreement supports Uzbekistan’s green transition with short-term hydrocarbon revenue.

3. Institutional Depth: Legal and technical infrastructure reforms are proving effective and attractive to investors.

4. Strategic Flexibility: Both countries are diversifying their partnerships, avoiding over-dependence on China or Russia.

   
   

The SOCAR–Uzbekistan PSA symbolizes a pivotal moment in Eurasian geopolitics. It’s not merely an energy deal it's a blueprint for lateral, sovereign cooperation that challenges decades of top-down dependency models.

For Central Asia, 2025 may well be remembered as the year the region stepped out of the shadow of geopolitical giants and began to shape its own energy destiny. The collaboration between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan exemplifies how smaller, agile powers can lead integration processes, promote regional development, and establish new norms for energy diplomacy.

This is how we get a glimpse of the future one where Central Asian nations are no longer intermediaries but architects of their own energy order.

Myanmar Junta Lifts State of Emergency but Retains Military Control Ahead of Elections

Hadisur Rahman, JadeTimes Staff

H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Asia

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Image Source: AFP/Getty Images

In a move widely seen as symbolic rather than substantive, Myanmar’s military junta has ended the state of emergency that has gripped the country since the February 2021 coup, while simultaneously forming a so-called “caretaker government” to oversee upcoming elections. Despite the procedural shift, power remains firmly in the hands of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the architect of the coup, who continues to serve as both acting president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The announcement came via state media on Thursday, with officials declaring the decree that empowered the military under emergency rule has now been revoked. A new interim civilian led government and an electoral oversight commission have been established as part of preparations for elections expected in late 2025 to early 2026.

However, analysts and international observers have dismissed the move as a cosmetic reshuffle. “They are just rearranging the same pieces and calling the regime a new name,” said David Mathieson, an independent Myanmar analyst. “This is part of preparations for an election which we don’t know much about.”

The regime insists it is planning elections in phases between December and January, but serious doubts surround the credibility and logistics of such a vote. Myanmar remains deeply fractured by civil war, with the military lacking control in large swathes of territory and facing fierce resistance from armed ethnic and pro-democracy groups.

A national census last year could only be conducted in 145 of the country’s 330 townships, underlining the military’s limited reach. State media also confirmed martial law and emergency powers will continue in at least 60 townships across nine regions due to escalating violence.

The elections are widely expected to be unfree and unfair. Western governments have already labeled the planned polls a sham, designed to entrench military rule under the guise of democracy. Opposition parties, including those linked to ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, have been banned from participating or have refused to legitimize the process by taking part.

Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis remains severe. According to a January report by Amnesty International, more than 6,000 civilians have been killed since the coup, with over 20,000 detained and 3.5 million internally displaced. The junta continues to deny all allegations of human rights violations, claiming the reports are part of a Western disinformation campaign.

Despite the upheaval, some nations, including China, have voiced support for Myanmar’s “political path.” Beijing reiterated its endorsement on Thursday, stating it supports Myanmar’s development and domestic political agenda, in line with its “national conditions.”

The 2021 military takeover, which deposed the civilian government led by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, was justified by the generals as a response to alleged election fraud a claim dismissed by international observers and independent election monitors.

While the lifting of the state of emergency may appear to be a step toward normalization, many experts warn it is unlikely to change the lived reality of most Myanmar citizens. The civil war, widespread violence, and ongoing repression continue unabated.

With elections on the horizon and martial law firmly in place across much of the country, Myanmar’s journey back to democratic governance appears uncertain at best.

Trump’s Tariffs Reshape Asia’s Trade Landscape: Which Economies Were Hit the Hardest?

Hadisur Rahman, JadeTimes Staff

H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Asia

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Image Source: AFP via Getty Images

In a sweeping move with global economic implications, President Donald Trump’s administration has announced new tariffs targeting a wide range of Asian economies, reshaping trade relations across the Indo-Pacific. The measures, introduced on “Liberation Day” in April and revised by the end of July, have sent shockwaves through export-dependent nations, many of which scrambled to strike deals before the 1 August deadline.

Traditional US allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, have managed to negotiate significant reductions in the proposed tariff rates.

Japan and South Korea, both vital to US industries through their automotive and semiconductor exports, successfully reduced an initial 25% tariff to 15%. These negotiations were finalized just days before the deadline, with Trump lauding the Japan agreement as the “largest trade deal in history.”

Taiwan, a major semiconductor supplier and key strategic partner, saw its tariff drop from 32% to 20%. However, concerns remain over potential sector-specific tariffs on chips.

Australia maintained its earlier 10% tariff rate, avoiding any increase. Meanwhile, neighboring New Zealand saw its rate increase from 10% to 15%, prompting official protests from Wellington.

While China was not directly included in the latest tariff list, ongoing diplomatic efforts point to tense negotiations. Washington is seeking commitments from Beijing on curbing fentanyl production, expanding US market access, and increasing purchases of American goods. In exchange, China hopes to secure continued access to critical US technologies. The two sides have now agreed to a 90-day extension of their existing trade truce.

India, though referred to by Trump as a “good friend,” was not spared. It faces a 25% tariff, down slightly from the originally proposed 27%, along with an unspecified penalty linked to its procurement of Russian oil and arms. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described India's ties with Moscow as a "point of irritation" in bilateral relations.

Southeast Asia, heavily reliant on exports, has experienced a range of outcomes. Initially hit with tariffs as high as 49%, ASEAN nations rushed to negotiate more favorable terms. Vietnam led the charge, cutting its rate from 46% to 20%, setting a precedent for other ASEAN members.

Most other countries Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam now face tariffs between 19% and 20%.

Brunei stands slightly higher at 25%, while Laos and Myanmar are the hardest hit, each facing 40% levies. Analysts point to their weaker market access and stronger ties to China as possible reasons for the heavier penalties. Singapore remains largely unaffected, with its 10% tariff unchanged due to its status as a net importer of US goods.

In South Asia, Pakistan emerged relatively unscathed with a 19% tariff the lowest in the region. The decision comes amid warming ties between Islamabad and Washington, highlighted by Pakistan’s nomination of President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize in June. This move is expected to bolster Pakistan’s textile exports, which account for 60% of its trade, primarily with the US.

Afghanistan, Fiji, Nauru, and Papua New Guinea each face 15% tariffs, while Kazakhstan has been assigned a 25% rate.

Experts caution that these tariffs are subject to change. Dr. Deborah Elms of the Hinrich Foundation noted, “The executive order allows the president to adjust tariffs at will. Agencies also have wide discretion in addressing trade obstacles.” As negotiations continue and global alliances shift, the full economic impact of Trump’s tariff strategy remains to be seen.