Forced or Voluntary? The 2025 Afghan Repatriation Surge Explained

Khoshnaw Rahmani, Jadetimes Staff

K. Rahmani is a Jadetimes news reporter covering politics.

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Image Source:UNHCR

Executive Summary

In early 2025, over 1.5 million Afghans crossed back into Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, driven by a mix of deportations, visa expiries, and economic hardship. While governments portray these returns as voluntary, reports highlight coercive tactics including legal ultimatums, employment bans, and detentions abroad. This article maps the full arc of Afghan repatriation—from Soviet-era flight in 1979 through UN-facilitated returns to today’s mass movements—situates the crisis in global context, and outlines the humanitarian, political, and policy challenges ahead. Drawing on UNHCR, academic research, and firsthand accounts, we offer an expert, in-depth analysis geared to policymakers, practitioners, and informed publics.

Introduction: The 2025 Homecoming

In the first half of 2025, Iran and Pakistan undertook large-scale actions prompting over 1.5 million Afghan nationals to return to their homeland. Iran’s intensified deportations and Pakistan’s expiration of temporary protection visas left many with no legal status or livelihood options abroad. These waves mark one of the region’s largest repatriation surges in recent history, unfolding amid Afghanistan’s fragile economy, reduced humanitarian aid, and contested governance.

Historical Context of Afghan Repatriation

Soviet-Era Exodus (1979–1989)

Afghan displacement began with the 1978–79 communist purges and escalated after the Soviet invasion on Christmas Eve, 1979. By 1980, over four million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran, sparking a refugee enterprise that would span four decades. These early waves laid the groundwork for enduring diaspora communities and episodic repatriation efforts.

Post-Soviet Returns and Early UNHCR Programs (1989–2001)

The Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 catalyzed the first major repatriation: roughly two to three million Afghans returned home by the early 1990s under UNHCR tripartite agreements with Pakistan and Iran. A 1992 Tripartite Commission formalized return incentives, offering cash grants, wheat rations, and transport assistance for those opting to repatriate voluntarily.

Karzai Era Repatriation (2002–2014)

Following the U.S. intervention and the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, UNHCR launched large-scale repatriation centers in Peshawar, Quetta, and Iran’s Dogharoun gateway. Between 2002 and 2014, nearly 5.3 million Afghans returned from neighboring states, making this phase the largest UNHCR-facilitated repatriation on record.

Taliban Return and Policy Shifts (2015–2024)

From 2015, both Pakistan and Iran oscillated between welcoming and expulsive policies. Iranian administrations under Ahmadinejad imposed forced repatriations and employer fines in 2007, only to reverse course under Rouhani in 2013 with more conciliatory registration drives. Pakistan’s 2023 “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan” targeted undocumented Afghans and ACC cardholders, setting deadlines that triggered renewed mass exits through 2024.

Anatomy of the 2025 Repatriation Surge

Scale and Demographics

From January to July 2025, UN agencies recorded 1.9 million Afghan returnees: 1.5 million from Iran and over 300,000 from Pakistan. Sixty percent of those from Iran were deported, while 70 percent of Pakistan returnees were undocumented migrants facing legal expulsion orders. Children under 18 comprised 43 percent of Iranian returnees and 53 percent of Pakistan returnees, underscoring family-wide impacts.

Push and Pull Factors

• Host-Country Pressure: Iran’s denial of healthcare and work rights for undocumented migrants, combined with Pakistan’s March 31 deadline for ACC holders, forced many to “volunteer” under duress.

• Economic Hardship: Sanctions-linked unemployment in Iran and stifled markets in Pakistan eroded refugees’ ability to sustain livelihoods.

• Security and Identity: Returnees cited renewed hope for stability under redirected Taliban governance, though major uncertainty about services and rights persists.

Timeline of Key Events in Afghan Repatriation

Year	Event	Returnee Numbers
1979	Soviet invasion	> 4 million fled
1988	UNHCR-Pakistan bilateral agreement	600,000 returned
1992	First Iran-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission	600,000+ returned
2002–2004	UNHCR voluntary repatriation centers opened	~ 800,000/year
2016	Pakistan repatriation drive under National Action Plan	365,000 forced returns
2025 H1	Iran and Pakistan urgencies	1.9 million returned

Comparative Analysis with Other Repatriation Cases

While Afghan repatriation in 2025 is unprecedented in its speed and scale, historical parallels exist. Post-Vietnam repatriation of Cambodians from Thailand (1979–1982) saw 360,000 return under UNHCR escort, dwarfed by Afghanistan’s 1.5 million half-year surge. Likewise, Mozambique’s 1992 peace accord facilitated the return of an estimated 3–4 million refugees over a decade, a demographic flux far smaller than Afghanistan’s recent six-month movements.

Humanitarian and Integration Challenges

Immediate Border Response

The UN’s Integrated Response Plan emphasizes emergency assistance at Islam Qala and Spin Boldak crossings: cash grants, nutrition screening, medical care, and temporary shelters. Yet funding for the 2025 plan remains at just 28 percent of requirements, straining capacity to reach tens of thousands daily. Border transit centers operate over capacity, forcing some families to sleep outdoors or in makeshift tents. Coordination between UN agencies, the Afghan Red Crescent, and local authorities is improving but still hampered by poor infrastructure and security constraints.

Community Reintegration

Returnees face chronic housing shortages as urban and peri-urban areas lack enough rental units to absorb newcomers. Unemployment rates exceed 70 percent in many provinces, pushing families into informal work and increasing child labor risks. Women and children are at special risk: up to 60 percent of female-headed households lack secure shelter, and unaccompanied minors face exploitation in crowded city centers. Civil society groups provide cash assistance, legal aid, and psychosocial support, but coverage varies widely between regions. Provincial jirgas and community committees help mediate land disputes, though local governance capacity remains uneven.

Policy and Governance Challenges

Afghan central and provincial authorities operate on severely constrained budgets, limiting public service delivery for returnees. Fragmented ministerial mandates create overlaps between the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, the Ministry of Economy, and local development bodies. Security concerns, especially in southern provinces, hinder aid agencies from maintaining continuous programs. Corruption perceptions among some officials undermine trust, deterring diaspora and donor engagement. A cohesive national repatriation strategy, aligned with Afghanistan’s broader development plans, is still in draft form.

International Response and Funding Gaps

Despite early goodwill pledges, the 2025 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan is only 30 percent funded. Key donors—EU member states, the United States, and GCC countries—have yet to fulfill multi-year funding commitments. UNHCR and WFP have initiated scaled-up cash-for-work and school-feeding schemes, but reach remains limited to main transit hubs. Local NGOs and women-led organizations report acute shortages in operational budgets, hampering grassroots reintegration efforts. Negotiations with neighboring states over refugee status and future mobility corridors continue but lack clear timelines.

Recommendations and Policy Implications

• Freeze Arbitrary Deadlines: Iran and Pakistan should suspend deportation orders and extend temporary protection statuses to allow more orderly, voluntary returns.

• Expand Legal Pathways: Establish humanitarian visas and family-reunification programs to reduce irregular movements and human rights violations.

• Integrate Returnees into National Plans: Align repatriation with Afghanistan’s National Peace and Development Framework to ensure access to land, credit, and public services.

• Scale Multiyear Funding: Donors must commit to predictable, multi-year funding streams for both immediate humanitarian needs and medium-term reintegration.

• Strengthen Local Capacities: Invest in provincial governance, civil society, and community-based organizations to manage reception, dispute resolution, and psychosocial support.

Conclusion

The 2025 Afghan repatriation surge highlights the fragility of displacement solutions when host-country policies shift abruptly. A holistic response—bridging emergency aid, development planning, and regional diplomacy—is essential for ensuring that returns remain voluntary, dignified, and sustainable. Without decisive action by Afghan authorities, neighboring governments, and the international community, today’s mass movements risk entrenching cycles of crisis rather than fostering durable peace and resilience.